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The article analyses the influence of the 2004 enlargement and
of the 1998-2002 accession negotiations on the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) reform. In contrast to the dominant liberal
institutional political economy models that explain pre-
enlargement CAP reforms in terms of the negative trade related
policy externalities, the common budget expenses and the spe-
cific role played by the common institutional setting, a critical re-
alist explanatory model is proposed. In accordance with the
model, the reforms were facilitated by the conflicting interests and
the differences in capacity of the capital fixed to agricultural pro-
duction in the member states and the candidate countries. The
capacity of the agro-capital is defined by comparing the agri-
cultural production structures, which were in the case of the old
member states sustaining high levels of the fixed capital and
which were in the case of the candidate countries, on average,
underdeveloped and under-capitalized. The model is supported
by the empirical analysis of the CAP reform and the accession
negotiations process.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, CommonAgricultural Policy (CAP) played the role
of the European Communities' single most important redistri-
bution mechanism. By guaranteeing relatively high commodi-
ty prices, CAP supported the development of agricultural pro-219
 
ductivity. On behalf of the commonmarket and common poli-
cy financing, member states with the highest agricultural pro-
duction relative to consumption levels were beneficiaries of
CAP (Tracy, 1993).
Compared to EU-15, CEEC's1 total GDP was about 4%,
their total agricultural output around 30% and the farming
population approximately equaled the old EU's 20 million far-
mers (Gorton and Davidova, 2001). On average, CEEC's agri-
cultural sectors were extensive and underdeveloped (OECD,
2002). Under a high product supports based CAP regime, their
agriculture would face substantial financial inflows and pro-
ductivity increases (Buckwell and Tangermann, 1997; Münch,
2000). From the eighties on, the EU was already coping with
excessive production and high costs related to it. Since pro-
duction exceedingmarket demand had to be financed through
the common budget, increased budget expenses provoked
disputes between member states. Furthermore, the dumping
of agricultural products onworldmarkets triggered trade wars.
In 1992, a year before enlargement criteria were estab-
lished in Copenhagen, the Council of Agriculture agreed on a
profound CAP reform. "MacSharry's" reform, decreasing in-
stitutional prices and introducing compensatory payments,
was commonly related to the GATT Uruguay Round Agree-
ment, regulating agricultural subsidies (URAA) (Coleman and
Tangermann, 1999; Moyer and Josling, 2002). The Agenda
2000 reform from 1999, when accession negotiations on the
agriculture chapter began, and the Mid-Term Review Reform
(2003), agreed just after accession negotiations were conclud-
ed, phased-out most of the production based supports and in-
stituted direct payments and program-based rural develop-
ment supports. Following the liberal institutional model based
explanation, growing expenses, institutional setting and its
changes enabled the building of support for the reform "libe-
ralizing" CAP, with supports, decoupled from the current pro-
duction now explicitly targeting "new multifunctional" (eco-
nomic, social and environmental) objectives (Garzon, 2006, 2007,
41; Swinnen, 2008).
We find this interpretation of the reforms problematic. First
of all "direct payments" (more than 60% of post-reform CAP
expenses) were nothing else than total historical supports
allocated to an individual farm, now paid in the form of a sin-
gle annual payment. In contrast to CAP's newly declared ob-
jectives, there was little change in aggregate agricultural sub-
sidies or their allocation. Thus, the decoupling of supports
seemed to merely respond to internal and world productivity
pressures on the capital fixed to agricultural production (land,
agro-technology, infrastructure), levied by intensive industri-
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port mechanisms basically fixed the supports to the agricul-
tural production factors (Schrader, 2000, 231) (H1) the mecha-
nisms reform preserved the interests of the agricultural production
based capital, pressured by productivity development and globaliza-
tion (europeization) of agro-food networks.
New support mechanisms increased price pressures on
production. But since CEEC's historical productionwas relative-
ly high (compared to their GDP based contributions to the
common budget) direct payments would still provide for sub-
stantial financial transfers to their agricultural sectors (Ackrill,
2003). The European Commission (EC, 2002a) argued that high
direct supports would have suboptimal effects for moderni-
zation of the CEEC's agriculture. However, the financial disci-
pline principle, applied in a manner of balancing member
states' contributionswith payments received from the CAP bud-
get, in contrast to achieving extremely little in terms of CAP's
general efficiency, severely curbed the CAP based financial
transfers to CEECs. In order to respect the financial discipline
commitment, CEECs had to comply with provisions limiting
the phasing-in of direct payments (Swinnen, 2003). Such mul-
tiple-speed development of the CAP was further strength-
ened by the rural development supports, specifically target-
ing multifunctional objectives, which demanded for nation-
al/regional co-financing and capital intensive programs (EC,
2003). The reason for CEEC's conformity with such arrange-
ment seemed to be the fact that CEEC's agriculture mostly con-
sisted of semi-substantial farms with low capital levels and
low returns. Thus (H2) the pre-enlargement reforms accommodat-
ed CAP to the relative spatial development of the agro-food capital.
For the liberal institutional model, the EU's institutional
setting played a vital role. In the final phase of the negotia-
tions, candidate countries conformed to the arrangement un-
der which the economic position of their agriculture would
be only nominally improved (Schrader, 2000, 238). This seemed
to be related to the impact that the highly institutionalized de-
bate over the common budget had on the enlargement pro-
cess (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2004). However, as far as CEECs
are concerned, the budgetary aspect of the distributional bar-
gaining related to the CAP and the enlargement merely re-
flected the weak role of CEEC's agricultural production based
capital. Thus, (H3) the reform and the enlargement processes were
determined by the structural power exerted by the locus of agricul-
tural production dependent capital.
In contrast with the common explanations, themodel pro-
posed stresses the importance of the enlargement for under-
standing the developments in the contemporary CAP. In chap-
ter 2, the standard liberal institutional approach towards the
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Chapter 3 establishes structural factors shaping the globaliza-
tion of the "agricultural welfare state" (H1) and chapter 4 ap-
plies the explanation to the case of integration of CEEC (H2).
Chapter 5 demonstrates how institutionally-specific characte-
ristics of the accession negotiations processwere shaped through
structure of interests (H3). We conclude our text by discussing
the implications of our analysis for understanding of the CAP
and of the EU project "beyond" the "common" perspectives.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESEARCH
Following the common argument based on the liberal institu-
tional approach, the modernization of agricultural produc-
tion raised CAP budget costs and increased negative exter-
nalities in terms of distribution of costs between the member
states, as regards global trade, development and environment.
Different lobbies increased the pressure for liberalization of
agricultural production and trade (Daugbjerg, 1997). In addi-
tion, new pressure groups emerged in the CAP field (e.g. en-
vironmental NGOs), demanding for sustainable agricultural
practices and defending traditional family farm based agri-
culture (Garzon, 2007, 16-7). The 1992-2003 CAP reforms made
a distinction between raw agricultural products, the price of
which was considered to be left to the market, and "joint-pro-
ducts" of agricultural production practices, such as economic
viability of rural areas, animal welfare, protection of animal
habitats etc. Since most of the latter were considered to be im-
portant public goods, it was decided that theywould be support-
ed through modification of the CAPmechanisms (EC, 2003).
New issues and actors as well as global pressures on EU's
policies have influenced CAP reforms. Simultaneously, re-
forms were affected by specific institutional characteristics, de-
fining the EU as a three level (super-state, inter-state and state-
-level) polity (Moyer and Josling, 2002). EU enlargements in
the eighties and nineties have increased the complexity of
strategic coalitions made in the European Council, thus in-
creasing the role of the European Commission and its ser-
vices, claiming to be representing the interests of EU's con-
sumers and taxpayers. The installment of multi-year financial
agreements replacing the annual budgets further made the
institutional setting more pro-reform biased. Due to the en-
hanced transparency of financial redistribution and of the com-
mon budget related moral hazard, contributors to the com-
mon budget pressured for budget stringency (Cunha, 2004;
Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2004; Swinnen, 2008).
The problem of discrepancy between "liberalization" and
"multifunctional goals" discourse and practice, which we have
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cal. In fact, the dominant CAP reform discourse is based on a
valid epistemic practice – the practice of institutionalized
reform process. However, we do doubt that this practice is per
se a robust limit of relevant knowledge-claims. The issue here
is essentially methodological (Wight, 2006, 31-2; Jackson,
2011, 196-200). By "methodological" we mean the theory of
validity of knowledge-claims. The liberal institutional frame-
work applies empiricist methodology which basically univer-
salizes individual pragmatic validity criteria.2 There are at least
two potential problems with such an approach. Firstly, con-
ventions, enabling the agency to reason about its behavior, may
not be "neutral" to practice. Secondly, conventions may not be
the limits (determinants) of the practice. The former argument
usually divides positive and reflexive epistemologies. Reflex-
ive epistemologies point to the interest biased discourses (or
in fact any other social institutions). However, "multifunc-
tional" and "liberal" discourses demonstrate the transforma-
tion of the criticism of the old protectionist CAP into a new
"dominant" CAP discourse, basically leaving its distributional
practice unchanged. This leads to the second problem, indi-
cating that conventions do not limit or simply determine
practical struggles, but depend on underlying structural ten-
dencies which find their expression in social institutions (dis-
courses). "The role of political action and policy-making /.../
the way agency is being realized through political action and
the deployment of different discursive practices, point on/ the
relationship between deepest structural tendencies and poli-
cy trends and the way these are constituted in relation to, and
mediated through, the agency of individual landmanagers and
other actors" (Potter and Tilzey, 2005, 583).
The first, reflexive point and the second, realist point, are
fundamental to critical realism. By observing the transforma-
tions and tensions in social institutions, critical realism tries to
determine dispositional properties of the objects, approxima-
ting a "mind-independent world" (Patomäki and Wight, 2000,
223; Kurki, 2008, 198, 286).
In spite of the "deep" methodological difference between
the two frameworks, on the level of concrete methods, both
can be pluralist. For our research, we have used academic pa-
pers on the enlargement and CAP reform in the observed pe-
riod, think tank policy papers and analyses, formal statistical
data, published and unpublished records of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Food, of the Governmental Office
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia (NTARS 2000),
as well as information gathered through interviews with var-
ious participants in the negotiating process, including the EC
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ministries for agriculture in Austria, Germany, Spain, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Italy, Great Britain, and Sweden), and can-
didate countries (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Cyprus, and Slo-
venia). The interviews were conducted by one of the authors
between September 1998 and December 2002.
Reform
dimensions Liberal institutional Critical realist
Globalization • Productivity growth increased • Strategies of intensive agricultural
of agriculture expenses and negative externalities producers and of owners of capital
• New actors, expectations and fixed to agricultural production
priorities emerged (environment, (land, agricultural machinery etc.)
global trade) (H1)
Enlargement • Current CAP would produce • CAP was accommodated in order
suboptimal effects: excessive sup- to prevent redistribution of subsi-
ports, additional productivity dies to CEEC's semi-substantial
increases and policy lock-in. Thus, agriculture, operating on the basis
phasing-out of production based of low rents and low capital
supports and financial discipline (H2)
were strengthened.
Role of • CAPmechanisms were accommo- • Institutional characteristics of
common dated to the context of the enlarged EU the process were merely a medium
institutions • Enlarged Council strengthened for the structural power
the role of EC, common financing exerted by the locus od agricultural
triggered pressures for budget production dependent capital
stringency (H3)
GLOBALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL WELFARE STATE
For almost thirty years, in European Communities, agricultural
product prices were agreed on the agricultural ministers' le-
vel at the beginning of each marketing year. They were su-
stained above the world prices using mechanisms like tariffs,
institutional buy-outs and export subventions. Thus, CAP sup-
ported European agricultural production. Yet, effects of the
European agricultural welfare state were controversial; subsi-
dies were highly concentrated on the margin of most pro-
ductive farmers with around two thirds of the subsidies being
capitalized in input prices (land, agro-machinery, chemicals).
CAP was also redistributing economic resources between Eu-
ropean Communities' members with those producing themost
(historically, this was France) being CAP beneficiaries (Tracy,
1993).
The overproduction problem was immanent to CAP. Pro-






relatively inelastic demand for food. Lowering of institution-
al prices, which would be a normal reaction, was politically
unacceptable for at least two reasons; there was a gap be-
tween highly productive industrial farms and less productive
"family farms", with the latter being concentrated in specific
regions or member states. Secondly, the shrinking of the agri-
cultural production sector would especially harm the inter-
ests related to the scope of the factor use per se (interests of
fixed capital). Thus, productivity growth even provoked pres-
sures for higher supports. In the eighties, product surpluses
grew into mountains of grain and rivers of milk. Since exces-
sive production had to be financed through the common bud-
get (e.g. export subventions), the eighties saw a dramatic in-
crease in CAP budget costs (Ritson and Harvey, 1997).
Communities' members contributing relatively more than
receiving from the common budget, like the United King-
dom, Germany and the Netherlands, faced an additional dis-
tributional burden.3 Under the influence of the GATT Uru-
guay Round negotiations, the 1992 MacSharry reform low-
ered agricultural commodities prices and introduced pay-
ments compensating farmers for the revenue lost. The 1992
reform basically fixed part of the supports to the past produc-
tion and partly neutralized the effects of productivity deve-
lopment on different types and geographies of agro-capital. A
larger share of CAP was now financed from the CAP budget
(by European taxpayers).4
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ment on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994 established a "color box"
terminology for agricultural policy mechanisms. Export sub-
sidies, tariffs and other price (production) distorting measures
("amber box"), were constrained by limitations and considered
to be eventually phased-out. The EU's compensatory payments
as well as specific US support schemes ("blue box") were tem-
porarily allowed since they were interpreted as "supports tar-
geting limiting of the production". Investments in rural infra-
structure, compensations for specific production practices and
other "market non-distorting measures" ("green box") remained
unconstrained (Coleman and Tangermann, 1999).
A new global regime, regulating agricultural subsidies and
trade, emerged with the political discourse of G7, GATT and
OECD regarding the need to contain global negative exter-
nalities on behalf of CAP-like protectionist and mercantilist po-
licies (Buckwell and Tangermann, 1997; Moyer and Josling,
2002). However, in practice it was merely accommodating
strategic interests of the agro-food industry and of fixed agro-
-capital to intense productivity growth. Limitations to "trade-
-distorting" measures speeded up concentration in global agro-
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gricultural commodity prices were now being increasingly
determined by specialized highly productive farms (Potter
and Tilzey, 2007, 1294, 1296). The 1992 CAP reform, which left
the size and the structure of agricultural supports allocation
almost unchanged (Garzon, 2007, 28-9), both subsidized the
role of European agro-food industry in concentrated global
trade networks and preserved the agricultural production
related interests of fixed agro-capital.
The Agenda 2000 CAP reform further decreased product
prices and increased compensatory payments. It established
the "rural development pillar", allocating approximately 10%
of CAP budget funds for agro-environmental targets and
rural development programs. The 2003 Mid-Term Review
("Fischler's Reform") decoupled most of the price and produc-
tion based supports and introduced direct payments schemes
– under these schemes, qualifying for the WTO green-box,
supports only required to "keep the agricultural land in good
condition". In accordance with the EC (2003), post-reformCAP
no longer supported farmers for producing beyond the costs
recognized by global markets, but only compensated them
for extra costs of providing for specific common public goods
and positive externalities (Garzon, 2007, 41).
Environmental NGOs became active in the field of CAP
reforms in the late eighties. The 1996 BSE and dioxin crises o-
pened the food safety question, several farm lobbies and po-
litical parties began to defend the traditional family farm con-
cept (Potter and Lobley, 2004). However, as Schrader demon-
strated (2000, 232), the reformed CAP was far from being first
best policy choice for the declared multifunctional objectives.
"Green CAP" was a paradox in itself, since complete phasing-
out of CAP, now subsidizing farmers to produce and not to
produce, would per se provoke the biggest decrease of agri-
cultural pressures on the European environment.
One could still claim that reforms were provoked by the
institutional arrangement under which an increasing share of
CAP expenses were now financed from the budget. Reformist










shares % of central
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the common budget, joined by Sweden in 1995, pressured to
curb the budget imbalances (Ackrill, 2003; Garzon, 2006). Yet,
reforms did little to change the distribution of CAP subsidies
and prior to the 2004 enlargement did not even stop the CAP
budget growth (Footnote no. 4). In contrast to the institution-
al argument, member states' priorities basically reflected ef-
fects of global productivity developments on the types of their
agricultural structures. Between themember states and in their
domestic debates, there were increased cleavages between
agricultural syndicates with some defending intensive "mar-
ket" agriculture and others defending traditional and organic
agriculture (Potter and Tilzey, 2007, 1297). Decoupling of sup-
ports enhanced the market role of intensive producers and
payments, targeting multifunctional goals, preserved the rents
of fixed capital owners by continuing the employment of pro-
duction factors like land.5 France, with both highly intensive
crop farms in the Paris basin and less concentrated produc-
tion in southern regions, remained a big CAP beneficiary. The
UK's extensive landowners heavily benefited from agro-envi-
ronmental schemes as well (Lowe et al., 2002). These struc-
tural characteristics were determining decision-making on CAP
reform much more than the overall effects CAP had on the
economies of these countries, thus explaining the continuous
asymmetries in CAP's effects on EU members.
Agricultural policy developments in OECD countries were
similar (e.g. Conservation Security Program under the 2002 US
Farm Act; Potter and Tilzey, 2007, 1295; Potter and Lobley, 2004).
The URAA had an in-built agenda for further liberalization of
national agricultural policies. However, pressures on global
and regionalmarginal agricultural production, instituted by the
new global regime, triggered severe discontent. The Cairns
Group6 demanded for thorough liberalization of agricultural
support policies. The Doha Round was launched in January
2001 in Qatar, but negotiations have not led to a successful
conclusion. CAP reforms were signaling that at least on the
European continent, globalization of agriculture continued
regardless.
ENLARGEMENT AND CAP REFORM
CEEC's agriculture, which was already extensive and under-
developed, faced additional increases in labor intensity and
decreases in agricultural productivity in the 1990s (Gorton and
Davidova, 2001). They lost traditional export markets, many
workers were driven back to rural areas. At the end of the 1990s,
value added per agricultural worker in Poland and Romania
was 8% and 6% of the EU level (Pouliquen, 2001, 6).
In 1991, the EU and individual CEEC began to sign "Euro-
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relative abundance and low price of agricultural production
factors, the EU's agro-food export to CEEC grew at much fa-
ster rates than the import (Table 2). The problem of CEEC's agri-
culture was the developmental gap between their production
structures and global industrial farming. An average Polish
dairy farm had three cows! Simultaneously, subsidized inten-
sive production from EU-15 was taking over CEEC's markets.7
Trade liberalization and globalization of agro-food networks
changed little in terms of structural underdevelopment; incen-
tives to invest in CEEC's farming remained low and shares of
semi-substantial farms high. Capital intensive segments of the
agro-food industry like food processing were facing greatest
pressures (Baker, 2002; Tangermann and Banse, 2000).
% em- Food in
GDP PPP Agri- ployed in Agri-sur- total con- Agri-trade with
(% of EU-15 GDP agri- face (1997, sumer EU-15 (1993/2000,
average)* (1988) culture* million ha) spending* billion dollars)
Bulgaria 24,1 14,5 13,2 6,2 42,2 -14,3 18
Czech Republic 60,1 4,8 5,5 4,28 21,3 -113,3 -621,5
Estonia 38 7,1 7 1,2 32,7 -31,8 -184,3
Hungary 52,8 5,8 6,5 6,2 34,9 621,5 530,4
Latvia 29,2 7,4 14,4 2,52 33,3 -7,9 -163,4
Lithuania 29,5 11,3 18,4 3,5 44,4 3,3 -124
Poland 38,9 5,1 18,7 18,47 30,8 -254,6 -324,8
Romania 26,9 18,8 45,2 14,79 38,5 -332,9 -135,5
Slovakia 48,1 4,8 6,9 2,44 26,2 -77,5 -192,9
Slovenia 71,1 3,8 9,6 0,78 20,1 -82,6 -237,1
CEEC 7 22 60,39
EU-15 1,6 5 134,26 15
*2000/2001. Source: OECD, 2002; Baker, 2002; O'Callaghan, 2003, 174.
In June 1993, EU heads of states formally agreed on the
enlargement criteria. "Copenhagen criteria" ("democratic insti-
tutions, market economy, ability to meet market forces of the
EU and to fulfill membership obligations including the goals
of political, economic and monetary union") reflected the libe-
ral character of the enlargement project (Potter and Tilzey, 2007,
1292). When enlargement entered the agenda, it was argued
that CAP would provoke a 15 billion € transfer to CEEC's agri-
culture,whichwasmore than 70%of their 1999 agriculturalGDP
(Swinnen, 2003, 9). This would substantially pressure the CAP
budget distribution, provoke further production increases and
breaches of WTO commitments (Münch, 2000). Making new
member states CAP beneficiaries would produce further poli-
cy lock-in (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2004, 109). Finally, the
EC claimed (2002a) that extensive supports would be subop-









The Agenda 2000 reform, agreed at the Berlin EU Coun-
cil in 1999 just before the accession negotiations on agricul-
ture began, further fixed supports to historic yields and pro-
duction entitlements. In 2000, direct payments represented as
much as 69% (25,6 billion €) of CAP budget expenses. Falling
into the context of the failed SeattleWTO talks, the Agenda 2000
"liberalization" reform was specifically targeting CEEC's acces-
sion. Due to the nineties' modest protection levels and econo-
mic stress, CEEC's reference quantities for direct payments were
relatively low and scattered around numerous small farms
whose production in the post-reform period would be fur-
ther pressured on behalf of the lower institutional prices. How-
ever, a vast number of farms still guaranteed substantial CAP
budget transfer to CEEC. In accordance with analyses made,
the accession of eight CEECs (without Romania and Bulgaria)
in the post-Agenda 2000 CAP, would result in a 10 billion €
increase in CAP expenses (with direct payments costs represen-
ting 65%) (Münch, 2000, 128; Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2004,
101).
In the nineties, the debate on the CAP budget gained im-
portance. Since CAP expenseswere now financed from the com-
mon budget, this could be expected. During the negotiations,
member states settled on a narrow financial frame, enforcing
future budget stringency. Due to the fact that CAP budget con-
tributions correlated with members' GDPs and CEEC's GDPs
were relatively low (Schrader, 2000, 238), candidates were
forced to agree on financial constraints to their integration in-
to CAP. Thus, in contrast to the fact that the budget debate did
little to change the distribution of funds between the old
members or to increase the efficiency of CAP payments, it did
curb the allocation of subsidies to future new members.
The 2003 CAP reform continued the phasing-out of price
based supports in exchange of now fully decoupled direct
single farm payments. With the 2003 reform, direct payments
were re-conceptualized into compensations for complying
with specific production standards.9 The rural development
pillar, instituted by the Agenda 2000 reformwas strengthened.
"Multifunctional paradigm", instituting the imperative of mar-
ket behavior and only supporting farmers for provision of pu-
blic goods, was seen as a revolution of traditional CAP (Gar-
zon, 2006; Swinnen, 2008). We have already pointed to the
contradictions between multifunctional objectives and CAP
mechanisms. What decoupling (introduction of direct pay-
ments) de facto provoked, were increased price pressures on
CEEC's agriculture and depressed competition for CAP subsi-
dies on the EU level (the latter would be of EU's taxpayers'
primary interest). New production standards demanded ad-
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ment pillar, specifically targeting multifunctional objectives,
was not based on EU level tenders but on national programs,
demanding for capital intensive rural infrastructure and na-
tional co-financing. Already in the nineties, a relatively ineffi-
cient utilization of EU's rural development aids to CEEC's a-
griculture (SAPARD program) demonstrated that the real pro-
blem of their rural (agricultural) development were high in-
put and low output prices sustained by EU's agricultural sub-
sidies (Baker, 2002; O'Callaghan, 2003, 182).
After the 2003 reform, the Council of the EU declared (EC,
2003) that "/e/very country or Union has the right to an agri-
cultural policy of its own, provided it is sustainable and a-
voids or limits trade distortion. The support the EU offers to
its farmers is a policy choice, based on an objective of ensur-
ing a sustainable agriculture, in its social, economic and envi-
ronmental aspects. The reform confirms and acts on that choice,
and aims at securing the future of farmers in a changing world
in the light of societal demands and international requirements."
In other words, one year before the enlargement, CAP
was de facto "nationalized". In accordance with the liberal in-
stitutional model, the planned enlargement augmented the
will of the European Council and the ability of the Commis-
sion to rationalize CAP and to introduce new support targets
(Swinnen, 2008). Yet, from the perspective of EU level interest
groups (taxpayers, consumers or agricultural producers) there
was hardly any evidence of CAP rationalization. Further-
more, the common decision making in the European Council
and the common budget did not seem to have been the u-
nique setting, autonomously influencing the "rationalization
of the CAP", since nationalization of the CAP budget expens-
es merely reflected the structural differences between the a-
griculture of the old and of the new Europe. Contrary to in-
tensive producers or fixed capital owners in EU-15, CEEC's
agriculture was (on average) underdeveloped, bound by re-
gional and global agro-food networks, which were putting
downward pressures on its potential rents. This made them a
weak voice, enabling post-enlargement CAP to be established
on the basis of national budget effects and national multi-
functional targets, on behalf of which the old members were
able to sustain the asymmetrical capitalization levels of their
agricultural production based capital. In the following chap-
ter, this argument will be extended in order to explain the
whole accession negotiations process.
ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
Early in 1998 ten candidates began to "screen" the 31 chapters
of the acquis communitaire. The acquis of the seventh chapter
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governing individual products' market and support regimes,
of veterinary, phyto-sanitary and food safety standards. In 1999,
when candidates were drafting their formal positions, the EU
Berlin summit settled the Agenda 2000 reform, increasing the
importance of direct payments. A couple of months later, ne-
gotiations on the agriculture chapter officially began. During
several rounds of bilateral and multilateral sessions, the EU's
and candidates' representatives (EU was not represented by
DG enlargement but by Unit for Enlargement delegated from
DGAgriculture) exchanged their "common positions" and "ad-
ditional clarifications". Many issues were tackled at the parallel
informal "technical meetings".10
Following the Agenda 2000 reform, candidates were pres-
suring the EC to start the talks on reference quantities and quo-
tas, which were important for their direct payments. How-
ever, as we have tried to demonstrate in the above section,
accession of CEECs into the post-Agenda 2000 CAP was still
perceived as too expensive. Reformists saw the solution in a
complete phasing-out of direct payments, which was unac-
ceptable for the majority of the member states. Thus, the EC
was postponing the debate. In 2000 and 2001, the progress of
negotiations was only spasmodic. In its 2000 and 2001 reports,
the EC concentrated on problems related to CEEC's acquis
implementation. The 2002 report signaled serious delays in
establishment of the Integrated Administration and Control
System (IACS)11 (Baker, 2002).
Accession negotiations were clearly highly institutional-
ized. However, even the fact that the candidates were pres-
sured to comply with the acquis did not seem to specifically
reflect the role of EU's institutional resources but was essen-
tially related to CEEC's agricultural structures. For numerous
semi-subsistence farms with low capital, EU standards repre-
sented high costs (Zellei et al., 2005). The EU supported agri-
cultural modernization through pre-accession rural develop-
ment programs but the underlying effect of this carrot and
stick approach was soft deagrarization of CEECs. This reflect-
ed the fundamental structural characteristics of the candi-
dates' agricultural production: their farmers resembled more
self-sustaining agricultural workers than agro-capital owners.
The abundance of agricultural production factors was para-
doxically not strengthening but weakening the CEEC's nego-
tiating position. In EU-15, the role of agricultural lobbies was
different. They publicly argued that CEEC's agricultural pro-
ducts, non-complying with EU standards, will flood EU mar-
kets. Since there were presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions in France and Germany in 2002 with CAP figuring as an
important issue, these claims were mobilizing the pressure on
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In its enlargement strategy, published in January 2002
(EC, 2002a), the EC proposed direct payments to be only gra-
dually augmented in newmember states (from 25% in 2004 to
100% in 2013). Production between the years 1995 and 1999
was proposed as a reference for direct payments. On behalf of
the problems with implementation of IACS, candidates were of-
fered the possibility of Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS).12
There was not much reason for candidates to be satisfied with
the proposal. During the reference period, their production
was at the lowest levels. The EC's proposal was depressing
the potential growth of their agricultural sectors. Even the
SAPS scheme, which was presumably lessening bureaucratic
pressures on their agriculture, would in practice demotivate
potential production strategies of individual farmers due to
the flat-rate nature of payments. Simultaneously, DG Agri-
culture presented a study (EC, 2002b) claiming that the eco-
nomic position of candidates' agriculture would be improved
after the enlargement even if direct payments were not grant-
ed (with the exception of Cyprus and Slovenia). The enlarge-
ment strategy demonstrated two things: the EC was well
aware that candidates would comply with only the nominal-
ly improved position of their agriculture. And secondly, the
slow progress was due to the disagreement on direct payments
between the member states (or better said, between fixed capi-
tal owners and intensive producers) in which CEECs were, due
to their poor production structures, relatively unimportant
actors.
From April to the end of October 2002, negotiations on
quotas and reference quantities continued. Candidates tried
with direct bilateral negotiations with individual member sta-
tes. In the fourth week of October 2002, French president
Jacques Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
made an agreement which enabled the conclusion of negoti-
ations. They decided that direct payments will remain, but
the overall expenditures in the EU-25 on market interven-
tions and direct payments would be kept below the 2006 fi-
gure in real terms during the 2007-2013 financial perspective
period.
The Franco-German agreement, formalizing budget dis-
cipline and past production based subsidies as a framework
for CAP based redistribution, was endorsed at the October
2002 Brussels European Council (Daugbjerg and Swinbank,
2004, 101). Compared to the initial proposal of the EC, the fi-
nal compromise agreement, prepared by the presiding state
(Denmark), provided additional rural development funds for
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Candi-
dates were allowed to top-up direct payments (either from
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al rural development funds in the years 2004-2006). The maxi-
mum direct payment levels, including top-ups, ranged from
55% in 2004 to 100% in 2010. Some agricultural sectors in
Slovenia and the Czech Republic were allowed higher top-
-ups due to higher pre-enlargement supports. Where candi-
dates' contributions to the CAP budget would exceed their
benefits during the first years of accession, additional sup-
ports were granted (Swinnen, 2003, 8). This reflected both spe-
cific characteristics of candidates' agricultural sectors and their
conformity with the nationalist accession negotiations dis-
course.
The chapter on agriculture was de facto closed just prior
to the heads of states meeting in Copenhagen on 12 and 13
December 2002 (Baker, 2002, 12) when a final agreement on
enlargement was reached. During 2002, DG Agriculture was
already working on the 2003 CAP reform, settled in the year
between the successful conclusion of accession negotiations
and the accession itself (Dagbjerg and Swinbank, 2004, 103).
DISCUSSION
Planned enlargement was expected to increase direct CAP
costs, tensions related to budget distribution and other policy
related negative externalities. In accordance with both the li-
beral institutional model and the EU's official discourse, this
provoked rationalization of the CAP and establishment of the
new multifunctional targets. Common decision making and
common policy financing, being the central characteristics of
the institutional setting, specifically influenced pre-enlarge-
ment reforms.
In our analysis, we have tried to point out the weakness-
es of such a perspective. Productivity growth was not threat-
ening farmers per se, since the revenues on their physical
work were comparably low, but capital fixed to agricultural
production, whose supply would dramatically increase with
falling aggregate production activities, influencing the prices
and returns of agricultural assets and production inputs, was.
Several intensive producers supported CAP liberalization, since
they would benefit from the decreased input prices and agri-
cultural product supply. In accordance with our first hypothe-
sis, reforms, fixing subsidies to past production, satisfied the
essential interests of both types of agro-capital.
In contrast toWest European agricultural production struc-
tures, CEEC's farms were, on average, semi-substantial with
low levels of factor capitalization. Limitations to distribution
of CAP subsidies to the future new members and de facto
nationalization of CAP support was our second hypothesis,
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basically determined by the geography of agricultural pro-
duction structures. The ad hoc policy and institutional arrange-
ments curbing the potential supports' redistribution demon-
strated that common institutions only played an instrumen-
tal role (our third hypothesis). The majority of the formal mes-
sages (discourses) on the reform and enlargement processes
seemed to be simply targeting audiences, historically taxed by
CAP due to their high transaction costs for effective engage-
ment in policy reform. The weak role of the European taxpa-
yers and consumers, whose interests should be defended by
the EC, pointed to the importance of the notion of "structural
power".
With successful integration, living and working condi-
tions were not worsened for many of the CEEC's farmers, e-
specially in sectors such as livestock products, coarse grains,
fruits and vegetables. However, prior to the enlargement, the
agricultural policy "tax" on CEEC's economies was approxi-
mately half of the EU average. In contrast to inflated food pri-
ces and agricultural production input prices, prices of the raw
agricultural product remained relatively low after the enlarge-
ment. Thus, opportunity costs for CEEC's farmers to leave the
agricultural business were substantially increased, which
sometimes improved the position of those remaining in busi-
ness. Yet, in contrast to the fact that the new members' con-
sumers extensively financed their accession into CAP (Table 2,
food in total consumer spending), the biggest beneficiary of
their accession was the agro-food industry based in Western
Europe. In EU members like Slovenia, self-sustainability in
agricultural production fell to historically low levels. Such e-
volutionwas something thatwas not unexpected before the en-
largement (Schrader, 2000, 238; O'Callaghan, 2003, 180; Swin-
nen, 2003).
In contrast to the enlargement effects, the candidates' o-
verall formal satisfaction with accession agreements evident-
ly pointed towards the limitations of conventionalism (empi-
ricism) in theoretical perspectives. Conventions are essential-
ly instrumental social institutions. This is important when con-
sidering the developments of the contemporary CAP, which
seems to be fundamentally shaped by the budget discipline
principle that was instituted in 2002. In 2006, the total addi-
tional expenditures for agriculture (the "costs of enlarge-
ment") were 3,9 billion € (Swinnen, 2003, 7-9). The 2006-2013
CAP budgets were fixed at the 2006 level with only a 1% nomi-
nal yearly increase allowed. Since direct payments for new
members were being phased-in during the same period, it
was expected that this would provoke breaches to budgetary
limits. In 2004 and 2005, olive oil, cotton, tobacco and sugar
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decoupled most of the remaining market supports. Due to the
budget discipline provision, shares of direct payments were
modulated into the rural development pillar, which was not
bound by budget growth limitations and where effective sup-
ports were enhanced through national co-financing. Such de-
velopments demonstrated the strengthening of the role of in-
tensive producers, pressuring for liberalization of supports
regime on the EU's domestic market, and the strategies of lo-
calized (nationalized) agro-capital for preserving the rents by
commoditizing specific extensive production practices. In
spite of their extensive agricultural production factor resour-
ces, the recent "liberalization" and "extensification" of CAP have
paradoxically further weakened the position of new mem-
bers' agriculture in the EU's and global agro-food chains,
pointing towards the need to study CAP beyond its institu-
tional elements.
NOTES
1 Central and Eastern European candidate countries: Poland, Hun-
gary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia.
Malta and Cyprus negotiated their accession together with CEEC-8.
Bulgaria and Romania are taken into account in statistics on CEEC.
All statistics are from the period of accession negotiations.
2 This methodological practice is commonly referred to as positivist,
with positivism being a philosophy of science (Jackson, 2011, 69-71).
3 Additional becausemost of themwere also net food importers which
meant that CAP was already a negative tax for their economies.
4 Following Schrader's calculation (2000, 238), between the 1986-8/
1996-8 periods, CAP transfer from EU consumers dropped from 84
to 52 billion ECU and trasnfer from taxpayers to farmers increased
from 22,5 to 58 billion ECU.
5 In the nineties, shares of rented agricultural land ranged between
34% in United Kingdom to 65% in France (EU-15 average was 41%).
Shares were generally increasing.
6 13 of 20 world's biggest agricultural products exporting countries
(exempting EU and US, the biggest exporters).
7 Hungarian beef and pork production declined for 10% during 1996-
-2000 (in 1997, quarter of production was exported in Germany and
other EUmembers) (O'Callaghan, 2003, 175). Prior to accession, some
CEECs were increasing protection measures but on average, these
remained under EU levels. EU product support estimate average (PSE)
was 38% in 2000 and PSE of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Repu-
blic and Latvia was 15-25% (Baker, 2002).
8 Semi-subsistence farmswould tend to treat direct payments as house-
hold income, low productivity and hidden unemployment would
persist (Dagbjerg and Swinbank, 2004, 103).
9 If producing, 18 "cross-compliance" requirements, related to environ-
mental protection, food safety and animal health and welfare, had to
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10 There were 32 such meetings for Slovenia in four and a half years
of accession negotiations. They were most frequent during the first
and last year of negotiations. Altogether there were almost 100 tech-
nical meetings of various forms.
11 The IACS system is the mechanism by which producers claim their
subsidies.
12 Financial rights would be established on the basis of agreed base
areas, average yields, and eligible cattle and sheep numbers. These
rights would then be disbursed on a flat-rate basis, over the entire
agricultural area (Dagbjerg and Swinbank, 2004, 104).
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"Veliki prasak" proširenja i reforma
Zajedničke poljoprivredne politike
Marko LOVEC, Emil ERJAVEC
Biotehnički fakultet, Ljubljana
U članku se analizira utjecaj proširenja iz 2004. i pristupnih
pregovora od 1998. do 2002. na reformu Zajedničke
poljoprivredne politike (ZPP). Za razliku od prevladavajućih
političko-ekonomskih modela liberalnog institucionalizma,
koji ZPP reforme iz vremena prije proširenja objašnjavaju
negativnim trgovinskim vanjskim učincima, zajedničkim
proračunskim rashodima i specifičnom ulogom koju je
odigrao zajednički institucionalni okvir predlaže se kritičko-
-realistički model tumačenja. U skladu s modelom, reforme
su olakšane zbog sukobljenih interesa i razlika u kreditnoj
sposobnosti povezanoj s poljoprivrednom proizvodnjom u
zemljama članicama i zemljama kandidatkinjama. Kapacitet
agrokapitala definiran je usporedbom struktura poljopri-
vredne proizvodnje, koje su u slučaju starih država članica
održavale visoke razine fiksnoga kapitala, a koje su u slučaju
zemalja kandidatkinja, u prosjeku, bile nerazvijene i
potkapitalizirane. Model podupire empirijska analiza
reforme ZPP-a i procesa pristupnih pregovora.
Ključne riječi: Zajednička poljoprivredna politika, proširenje,
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